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I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Riggs, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided
whether a trial court may reduce a crime victim’s restitution award
when the victim was the initial aggressor. The restitution statute,
Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045, provides criteria that trial
courts must apply when awarding restitution; however, the victim’s
1
fault is not listed among the criteria. In Riggs, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that Minnesota Statutes section 611A.045
establishes exclusive criteria that prohibits trial courts from
2
considering any non-specified factors; as such, it prohibited
consideration of the victim’s fault in determining a restitution
3
award.
This Note first reviews the history of criminal restitution and
provides a background for understanding Minnesota’s restitution
4
law. It then discusses the facts of Riggs and examines the parties’
5
arguments and the court’s rationale for its decision. Next, it
analyzes the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in the context of
Minnesota’s case law on restitution and the court’s role in
6
interpreting statutes. This Note suggests that the legislature, not
the court, must weigh the policy choices in deciding whether
Minnesota’s restitution law should incorporate the victim’s
comparative fault, and it concludes that the court correctly
interpreted the restitution statute and correctly declined to
recognize comparative fault as an aspect of restitution
7
determinations.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. 2015).
Id. at 685–86.
Id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
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II. A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL RESTITUTION
A.

Generally

Criminal restitution is a court order directing an offender to
financially compensate his victim for the expenses and losses
8
incurred by the victim as a result of the offender’s crime.
Restitution typically does not compensate a victim for mental pain
and suffering, as might a civil remedy; rather, it only compensates
9
for tangible losses. Thus, the purpose of restitution is
compensatory: to make the criminal victim whole again. Yet,
10
restitution may also serve a punitive purpose. Restitution is part of
11
the criminal justice system; it is integrated with criminal
12
13
sentencing and is commonly ordered at the time of sentencing.
Restitution incorporates features of civil law, but it is distinct from
14
civil liability. Unlike a civil remedy, a restitution order acts as a
condition of a criminal sentence between the state and the
offender and not merely as a settlement or judgment between
15
private individuals. However, the imposition of a restitution order
does not necessarily preclude the victim from pursuing additional
16
civil remedies arising from the same incident.
B.

Early History
17

Criminal restitution is an ancient legal concept. Historians
trace its emergence to the development of the earliest structured
18
societies and legal codes. For example, restitution was prescribed

8. See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97
HARV. L. REV. 931, 932 (1984).
9. See 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 26.6(c) (4th ed.
2016).
10. See 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 2474 (2016).
11. See id. § 2479.
12. See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Persons or Entities Entitled to
Restitution as “Victim” Under State Criminal Restitution Statute, 92 A.L.R. 5th 35 § 2[a]
(2001); 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9.
13. See 9 HENRY W. MCCARR ET AL., MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 36:15 (4th ed. 2015).
14. See Winbush, supra note 12.
15. See 24 C.J.S., supra note 10, § 2479.
16. See id.
17. See Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933.
18. See Richard E. Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History, in
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in such codes as the Torah, the Code of Hammurabi (ca. 1700 BC),
the Code of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1875 BC), the Summerian Code of Ur19
Nammu (ca. 2050 BC), and the Code of Eshnunna (ca. 1700 BC).
Restitution was also a feature of the Roman Law of the Twelve
Tribes (ca. 449 BC); the Germanic tribal laws, Lex Salica (ca. AD
20
496); and early Anglo-Saxon laws in England (ca. AD 600). Within
these codes, restitution encompassed both proportional physical
retribution (e.g., “eye for eye”) and financial compensation to the
21
victim for his losses.
In ancient times, restitution served the joint purposes of
22
safeguarding the community and ensuring justice for the victim.
Prior to early legal codes, the victims of crime and the victims’
family members often sought private retribution against criminals
23
through violence and retaliation. Restitution offered a structured
substitute for such self-help measures and provided an authoritative
24
means to reconcile offender and victim. Criminal restitution thus
“protect[ed] the offender from violent retaliation by the victim or
25
the community” and served to maintain and restore community
26
peace and order. Furthermore, an overarching feature of early
CONSIDERING THE VICTIM 19, 19–21 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1975).
19. Daniel W. Van Ness, Restorative Justice, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION,
AND RECONCILIATION 7, 7 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1990); see Laster, supra
note 18, at 20–21; see, e.g., Numbers 5:6–7 (New King James) (“When a man or
woman commits any sin that men commit in unfaithfulness against the Lord, and
that person is guilty, then he shall confess the sin which he has committed. He
shall make restitution for his trespass in full, plus one-fifth of it, and give it to the
one he has wronged.”).
20. Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7.
21. See PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 4
(2d ed. 2010) (comparing Exodus 21:23–25, “life for life, eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for
stripe,” with Exodus 21:18–19, requiring the offender to “pay for the loss of his
[victim’s] time [during his recovery] and [to] have him thoroughly healed”).
22. Commentators vary in their assessments of the primary purpose of
restitution. Compare Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933
(“The primary purpose of such restitution was not to compensate the victim, but
to protect the offender from violent retaliation by the victim or the community.”),
with Laster, supra note 18, at 24 (“[T]he aim of [restitution] . . . was primarily to
make the victim whole and secondarily to minimize private revenge.”).
23. See Laster, supra note 18, at 19–20.
24. See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8–9.
25. See Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933.
26. See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8–9; see also Laster, supra note 18, at 21–22
(“[T]hese codes encouraged settlement or composition between the parties for
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restitution was its recognition of the victim’s right to receive just
27
compensation for injury. In this way, restitution also codified the
28
victim’s right to be made whole.
29
In its earliest forms, restitution was centered on the victim.
This stands in contrast to the state-centered notion of criminal
30
justice that arose during the Middle Ages. Prior to the Middle
Ages, beyond a short list of public “criminal” offenses, such as
31
witchcraft, bestiality, and incest, there was not yet a distinction
32
between civil law and criminal law. Most offenses against
individuals were resolved through prescribed restitutive measures
33
with the central focus on the victim and the victim’s family.
In the eleventh century, as political power consolidated under
the crown of England and the reach of government expanded, laws
were enacted that changed a number of offenses from crimes
34
against individuals into crimes “against the king’s peace.” These
laws ushered in a new legal era in which the king and the state
eventually supplanted the victim as the aggrieved party of particular
35
crimes.
In this new era, criminals were ordered to pay fines directly to
36
the government rather than make restitution to their victims.
Because violent offenses were seen as breaches of the king’s peace,
it was thought that the state was entitled to share in a victim’s

harmful acts as serious as homicide, personal injury less than homicide, rape,
adultery, and theft . . . . There are benefits . . . in reduction of tension, benefits to
the victim in monetary satisfaction, and benefits to the criminal in retrieving his
lost security.”).
27. See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7 (“What we see in ancient cultures is a
recognition that it was the victim who was injured by crime, and therefore it was
the victim who had the right to be compensated.”).
28. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 4.
29. See id. at 4–5.
30. See id. at 5; Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7.
31. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
32. See Laster, supra note 18, at 24.
33. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8.
34. See WILLIAMSON M. EVERS, THE INDEPENDENT INSTITUTE, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS,
RESTITUTION, AND RETRIBUTION 7 (1996); TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5;
Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8. But see Patrick D. McAnany, Restitution as Idea and
Practice: The Retributive Process, in OFFENDER RESTITUTION IN THEORY AND ACTION 15,
16 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1977) (placing the emergence of crimes
against the “king’s peace” in the 16th century).
35. See Van Ness, supra note 19, at 7–8.
36. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
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37

compensation. This change marked the point at which the law
38
began to diverge into separate criminal and civil branches; and
accordingly, “the victim’s right to compensation was [eventually]
39
incorporated into civil law.” As a result, the central standing of the
victim, and his right to be made whole through the criminal
40
process, was significantly diminished. Restitution thus became a
private civil right of action, untethered from its original restorative
41
purpose. Detached from a victim-centered approach, criminal
justice evolved to serve state-centric punitive goals: deterrence,
42
incarceration, and rehabilitation of the offender.
America’s criminal justice history mirrors this shift from a
victim-centered approach to a state-centered prosecution and
43
punishment of criminals. Prior to the American Revolution, the
investigation, apprehension, and prosecution of criminals was
largely accomplished through the efforts of private individuals with
the assistance of privately-funded investigators, bounty hunters, and
44
constables. The upshot of this privatized system was that upon
successful prosecution of the offender, the victim could expect to
obtain monetary damages from the offender or to obtain the
offender’s servitude until the offender satisfied the full value of the
45
damages.
By the start of the American Revolution, the private system of
46
criminal justice had given way to one of public administration.
The American government established professional police patrols
37. See Laster, supra note 18, at 28.
38. See id. at 23–24; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Victim Restitution
in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933–34.
39. Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process, supra note 8, at 933–34; see also
TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5.
40. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Laster, supra note 18, at 28.
41. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5; Laster, supra note 18, at 24–25,
28 (“This shift in focus may have resulted in monetary benefits for the king, but it
reduced the economic lot of the victim, shifted the aim of the law away from any
constructive policy of restitution, and reinforced the concept of harm to society to
justify the criminalization of certain ‘harmful’ acts to individuals.”); Van Ness,
supra note 19, at 8.
42. See Laster, supra note 18, at 25; Van Ness, supra note 19, at 8.
43. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 5–6.
44. See EVERS, supra note 34, at 15–16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21,
at 5–6.
45. See EVERS, supra note 34, at 15–16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21,
at 5–6.
46. See EVERS, supra note 34, at 16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
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charged with investigating and apprehending criminals. The
government also assumed total responsibility for initiating and
48
prosecuting criminal cases. Criminal sanctions that had at one
time directed restitution to crime victims were replaced by
49
imprisonment and fines paid to the government. Over time, the
crime victim’s role was diminished to that of a witness to the
government’s prosecution of the case, without regard for personal
50
compensation for their losses. By the mid-nineteenth century, the
51
transfer of restitution into the civil law system was complete.
C.

The Victims’ Rights Movement and the Re-emergence of Criminal
Restitution

The re-emergence of restitution within the criminal justice
system began with a renewal of public interest concerns for victims
52
of crime. Historians have traced the origin of this renewed
interest to academic works from the 1940s and 1950s about
“victimology”: the study of the relationship between victims and
53
offenders. As the study of victimology developed, researchers
began to identify changes to the criminal justice system that could
54
address the perceived exclusion of crime victims in the system.
Among the changes the researchers proposed were restoring
restitution to crime victims and increasing the role of the victim
55
during the criminal justice process.
In the 1960s, victimology began to influence public policy. For
example, momentum from the renewed interest in crime victims
influenced the recommendations of President Lyndon Johnson’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
which his administration established to study criminal justice and
make recommendations for systemic changes in response to rising
56
crime rates in the 1960s. The commission published a report in
1967 that recommended proposals to increase victim involvement
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
See EVERS, supra note 34, at 16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
See EVERS, supra note 34, at 16; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 6.
See id. at 6, 153.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
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in the criminal process, address crime victims’ financial losses, and
establish supplemental government-based systems of victim
57
compensation.
Although
distinct
from
restitution,
implementation of the first state-sponsored crime-victimcompensation programs in the 1960s marked a significant step in
58
reorienting the criminal justice system toward the victim.
During the 1970s and 1980s, support for victims of crime
developed into a full-fledged victims’ rights movement in
59
America. In response, victim-compensation and victim-assistance
60
programs were established in a majority of states. At the national
level, in 1981, President Ronald Reagan recognized the movement
61
by establishing the first National Crime Victims’ Rights Week.
Then, in 1982, President Reagan created the President’s Task
Force on Victims of Crime, which was charged with studying
62
criminal victimization and receiving input from victims.
Released in December 1982, the Final Report of the Reagan
Administration’s Task Force on Victims of Crime recommended
new federal and state legislation to establish restitution in all
63
criminal cases where the victim sustained financial losses. In 1983,
the American Bar Association endorsed the Task Force’s
recommendation, adding that crime victims should expect
sentencing judges “to give ‘priority consideration’ to restitution as a
64
condition of [the offender’s] probation.” Additionally, in 1982,
Congress enacted the federal Victim and Witness Protection Act
(VWPA), which mandated restitution to victims of certain federal
65
crimes. Congress updated the VWPA in 1996 with the Mandatory
66
Victims Restitution Act (MVRA).

57. Id.
58. See id. at 7–8.
59. Id. at 8–10.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id. at 10.
62. See id. at 7–8.
63. EVERS, supra note 34, at 24; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 10.
64. EVERS, supra note 34, at 24–25.
65. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96
Stat. 1248.
66. Bridgett N. Shephard, Classifying Crime Victim Restitution: The Theoretical
Arguments and Practical Consequences of Labeling Restitution as Either a Criminal or Civil
Law Concept, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 801, 806 (2014) (citing Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1227).
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Prior to the release of the Final Report, only eight states had
67
mandated victim restitution during criminal sentencing. However,
after issuance of the report, many states decided to enact or update
68
their criminal restitution statutes. By 1995, twenty-nine states had
69
adopted mandatory or presumptive restitution. Today, every state
has enacted criminal restitution statutes to compensate victims of
70
crime.
D.

Criminal Restitution in Minnesota

When Minnesota first enacted its criminal restitution statute in
71
1983, it prescribed very little. Crime victims were to request
restitution by providing the court itemized losses and reasons
72
justifying the amount requested. The court, in turn, merely had to
make a record of its reasons for granting or denying the requested
73
restitution. The statute neither mandated nor restricted the
74
court’s consideration to specific restitution criteria.
Over the next several years, Minnesota’s legislature established
additional procedural components for determining restitution that
controlled courts’ discretion. In 1985, the legislature enacted
section 611A.045, which, in part, mandated that district courts must
consider the “economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of
75
the offense” when calculating the award. Additionally, section
611A.045 established the evidentiary standard, preponderance of
76
the evidence, and placed the burden of proof on the prosecution.
Then, in 1989, the legislature added a second criterion for
restitution determinations: it mandated that district courts also
consider the “income, resources, and obligations of the
67. See TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 153.
68. EVERS, supra note 34, at 25; TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 154.
69. TOBOLOWSKY ET AL., supra note 21, at 154.
70. See 6 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9.
71. Compare Act of June 6, 1983, ch. 262, § 4, 1983 Minn. Laws 1125, 1127
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (1984)), with Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 355, § 6,
1977 Minn. Laws 765, 766 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 609.135 (2016)) (authorizing
restitution as a permissible sentence when a district court stays imposition or
execution of a felony sentence).
72. § 4, 1983 Minn. Laws at 1127.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Act of May 10, 1985, ch. 110, § 2, 1985 Minn. Laws 305, 306 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 611A.045 (1985)).
76. Id.
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77

defendant.” The 1989 amendment further clarified the scope of
the victim’s compensable losses: restitution could be awarded for,
but was not limited to, the victim’s out-of-pocket losses, medical
and therapy costs, replacement wages and services, costs of
78
returning a victim child, and funeral expenses.
In its current form, Minnesota’s restitution statute provides
two criteria for the trial court’s restitution determination. First, the
trial court must consider “the amount of economic loss sustained
79
by the victim as a result of the offense.” Second, the trial court
must consider “the income, resources, and obligations of the
80
defendant.” No other criteria or factors are listed.
III. THE RIGGS DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

On May 4, 2012, the eventual victim, D.S., confronted Brandon
Riggs at a Kwik Trip gas station in Minnesota City, Minnesota, over
81
the quality of the marijuana that Riggs had previously sold to D.S.
82
Riggs responded by leaving the gas station, and D.S. followed him.
After Riggs arrived at Cone Chiropractic in Winona, Minnesota,
D.S. followed Riggs into the office entryway and attacked Riggs by
83
punching him in the head. During the ensuing fight, Riggs
84
stabbed D.S. with a knife in the leg and stomach.
The State of Minnesota charged Riggs with second-degree
85
86
assault and terroristic threats. Riggs initially claimed self-defense.
Following a plea agreement, Riggs pled guilty to making terroristic

77. Act of Apr. 4, 1989, ch. 21, § 7, 1989 Minn. Laws 38, 42 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 611A.045 (1989)).
78. Id. § 4, 1989 Minn. Laws at 42 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (1989)).
79. MINN. STAT. § 611A.045, subdiv. 1(a) (2016).
80. Id.
81. State v. Riggs, No. 85-CR-12-960, 2013 WL 9348661, at *1 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
June 7, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865 N.W.2d 679
(Minn. 2015).
82. Id.
83. Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 237.
84. Id.
85. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 681.
86. Defendant’s Restitution Memorandum at 1, State v. Riggs, No. 85-CR-12960 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 7, 2013), 2013 WL 8981222.
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threats, and the State dismissed the assault charge. At the plea
88
hearing, Riggs formally waived his right to claim self-defense.
D.S. filed a victim’s restitution request, and the State sought
$2,973.07 from Riggs for restitution covering D.S.’s employmentrelated expenses incurred as a result of D.S.’s injuries from the
89
stabbing. Riggs asked the district court to reduce the requested
restitution award by half because D.S. was the initial aggressor in
90
the fight. The State argued that the restitution statute, section
611A.045, provided exclusive criteria for determining the amount
of restitution and therefore prohibited consideration of the
victim’s fault in calculating the amount of restitution because it was
91
not an explicit factor in the statute. The relevant portion of
section 611A.045 states:
The court, in determining whether to order restitution
and the amount of the restitution, shall consider the
following factors:
(1) the amount of economic loss sustained by the
victim as a result of the offense; and
(2) the income, resources, and obligations of the
92
defendant.
Over the State’s objection, the district court concluded that it could
exercise discretion to reduce the amount of the restitution “by
apportioning some of the fault for the victim’s injuries to the victim
93
if the victim was the aggressor in the conflict.” The district court
ordered Riggs to pay half of D.S.’s employment-related restitution
94
expenses.
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s restitution
award on statutory interpretation grounds, concluding that the
district court impermissibly considered the victim’s fault in
reaching its restitution award. The court of appeals construed
section 611A.045, subdivision 1(a), to mandate consideration of
only the explicit factors and not any other factor, including whether

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 681.
Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 237.
Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 681.
Id.
Id. at 681–82.
MINN. STAT. § 611A.045, subdiv. 1(a) (2016).
Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682.
Id.
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95

the victim was the aggressor. The Minnesota Supreme Court
96
granted Riggs’s petition for review.
B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision and Rationale

Riggs and the State argued for different interpretations of the
restitution statute before the Minnesota Supreme Court. First,
Riggs contended that the plain language of section 611A.045 “[did]
not limit what a court can consider [when determining restitution];
97
it merely specifie[d] the factors that a court must consider.”
According to Riggs, had the legislature intended to limit
consideration to the specified factors, the statute would have read
98
“shall only consider.” Under Riggs’s approach, the trial court
could consider the victim’s fault whenever it was relevant to the
restitution award. The State countered that the entirety of the
restitution statute demonstrated that the legislature used such
inclusive language as “may include, but is not limited to” to
99
indicate its intent for consideration of non-explicit factors.
According to the State, because section 611A.045 did not contain
such language, trial courts must not consider any factor beyond
100
those that are listed.
Addressing Riggs’s first argument, the majority concluded that
the plain language of section 611A.045, subdivision 1, establishes
exclusive criteria and prohibited consideration of any additional
101
factors. The majority supported its conclusion by reviewing the

95. State v. Riggs, 845 N.W.2d 236, 238–39 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865
N.W.2d 679 (explaining that the omission of a phrase from a statute is presumed
to be deliberate and therefore the legislature intentionally eliminated from
consideration any factors other than those enumerated to determine the
restitution amount).
96. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682.
97. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 4, State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015)
(No. A13-1189).
98. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn.
2015) (No. A13-1189), 2014 WL 4547916, at *11.
99. Respondent’s Brief, State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015) (No.
A13-1189), 2014 WL 5099417, at *9 (“Minnesota Statute[s] 611A.04, subd[ivision]
l(a) states, ‘[a] request for restitution may include, but is not limited to,’ followed by a
list of a number of factors that qualify as an economic loss resulting from the
crime.”).
100. Id.
101. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 684–85.
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restitution statute “as a whole.” The court pointed to section
611A.54, which addresses the state-funded victim reparations
program, and instructed the Crimes Victims Reparations Board to
consider the “contributory misconduct . . . of a victim” when
103
determining the amount of reparations to provide. The majority
concluded that the legislature’s choice to expressly include the
victim’s fault as a factor in the reparations statute but not the
parallel restitution statute demonstrates that the legislature
intended to create an exclusive list of factors in section 611A.045,
104
subdivision 1.
Second, Riggs argued in the alternative that even if the
language in section 611A.045 limits the trial court’s consideration
to the listed factors only, the phrase “as a result of the offense”
requires the district court to assess the causation of the victim’s loss,
which would necessarily include consideration of the victim’s
105
comparative fault, if any. To counter, the State argued that
criminal sentencing and civil lawsuits, rather than restitution, are
106
the proper forums to consider a victim’s fault.
Unlike the
restitution statute, the State reasoned, Minnesota criminal
sentencing and civil liability statutes expressly provide for
107
consideration of the victim’s role in causing a harm.
Furthermore, it argued that criminal sentencing and civil lawsuits
108
serve purposes distinct from restitution. According to the State,
restitution was created by legislation to serve the special purpose of
109
restoring criminal victims to their prior financial positions. The
State claimed that a victim’s right to restitution simply attaches
upon the defendant’s conviction; no additional causation analysis is
110
appropriate.
Although the restitution statute does contain language
suggestive of a causation analysis, the majority rejected Riggs’s
111
alternative argument. The court concluded that the phrase “as a

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 683.
Id. at 685 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 611A.54(2) (2014)).
Id.
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *13–14.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 99, at *6–8.
Id. at *7–8.
Id.
Id. at *6–7.
Id.
See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 685–86 (Minn. 2015).
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result of the offense” simply directs the district court to consider
whether the victim’s economic losses are the natural consequences
of the defendant’s crime; the factors leading to the crime, such as
112
an aggressor victim, are immaterial.
Disagreeing with the majority’s holding, three justices
dissented: Chief Justice Gildea, Justice Page, and Justice
113
Anderson. Justice Page viewed the majority as “speaking out of
114
both sides of its mouth.” According to Justice Page, although the
majority stated that it would not consider circumstances
surrounding the offense when determining a restitution award, the
court “necessarily considered the circumstances surrounding ‘the
offense’” because it “permitt[ed] a restitution award based on [an]
115
assault” when Riggs had only been convicted of terroristic threats.
Justice Page reasoned that based on the majority’s opinion, a
district court may “consider economic loss resulting from the
circumstances surrounding the offense of conviction, i.e., the
assault, to determine restitution” and “the circumstances
surrounding the assault—including the victim’s role as
116
aggressor.”
Chief Justice Gildea, joined by Justice Anderson, dissented on
different grounds. The Chief Justice argued that courts should
117
apply “traditional causation analysis” to the restitution statute.
According to the Chief Justice, the statutory phrase “as a result of
the offense” triggers the causation analysis typical of civil cases,
which permits the consideration of alternative or multiple causes of
the victim’s loss—causes which could include the victim’s
118
contributory fault.
The majority disagreed, reasoning that
causation analysis of the victim’s fault belongs to negligence law,
119
The majority
not restitution calculations in criminal law.
cautioned that the language of the statute demonstrates the
legislature’s choice to expressly incorporate comparative fault into

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 686–88.
Id. at 688 (Page, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 687 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 686 n.8 (majority opinion).
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the context of civil liability and criminal reparations but not
120
restitution; therefore, the court should not disturb that choice.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Issues of First Impression

The issues decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Riggs
were issues of first impression. These issues were: first, whether a
district court may consider only the two explicit factors in section
121
and
611A.045, subdivision 1, when determining restitution,
second, whether the explicit factors of section 611A.045, even if
exclusive, nonetheless incorporate consideration of the victim’s
comparative fault through the causation analysis typically used in
122
civil cases. Of the few Minnesota Supreme Court cases addressing
section 611A.045, subdivision 1, a majority of the cases directly
concern the application of the two statutory factors: the “economic
loss sustained by the victim” and “the ability of the defendant to
123
pay.” No previous Minnesota Supreme Court case had addressed
whether a trial court could consider the victim’s comparative fault
124
or any other non-explicit factors in its restitution determination.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 684 (“[W]e have not determined whether the two express factors in
section 611A.045, subdivision 1, comprise an exclusive list of the factors that a
district court may consider when imposing restitution.”).
122. Id. at 685–86.
123. See id. at 683; see, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 391 (Minn.
2011) (concluding that trial court properly considered economic loss of victim
and offender’s ability to pay despite restitution order’s lack of detail); State v.
Simion, 745 N.W.2d 830, 844–45 (Minn. 2008) (remanding case to trial court for
proper calculation of economic loss of victim in light of past payments by
defendant and the return of stolen property); State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652,
663–64 (Minn. 2001) (concluding that trial court properly considered offender’s
ability to pay); State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 672 (Minn. 1999) (concluding
that victim’s healing ceremony is not too attenuated from criminal offense to be
covered as an economic loss); State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 281–84 (Minn.
1996) (concluding that overall economic loss of three victims was established by
the preponderance of the evidence at trial despite the jury convicting the
defendant of a felony swindle offense against only one of the three victims); State
v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285–86 (Minn. 1995) (concluding that the legislature
granted courts broad discretion to structure restitution orders that factor in the
defendant’s ability to pay and that the lower court properly considered those
resources in its order).
124. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683–85.
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As this Note will explore, the court correctly concluded that
the legislature intended the factors listed in 611A.045 to be
exclusive and correctly declined to read comparative fault into the
125
statute. First, despite Riggs’s argument that the trial court acted
within its broad discretion to award or reduce restitution, the
legislature has limited the trial court’s discretion by enacting the
mandatory criteria listed in section 611A.045. As the State argued,
the statute contains no suggestion that trial courts may consider
126
any non-explicit factors, such as the victim’s fault. The plain
language of the statute, the context of surrounding statutes, and
the application of interpretive canons support the majority’s
conclusion that the legislature intended the listed factors in section
611A.045 to be exclusive and limiting on trial courts.
Second, Riggs’s alternative argument that comparative fault is
incorporated within the existing causation language of the statute
fails to account for the fact that comparative fault is generally
applicable to only unintentional, negligent actions. Riggs was
correct to argue that the language of Minnesota’s restitution statute
incorporates a causation test reminiscent of civil law; however, as
the majority responded, even within civil law, the particular test
Riggs argued for—comparative fault—is inapplicable to intentional
127
Because Riggs engaged in
torts, like battery and assault.
intentional conduct when defending himself from the eventual
victim, Riggs’s argument essentially asked the court to recognize an
inapplicable causation standard—one more appropriate for civil
negligence. The following sections of this Note expand on the
analysis of each of Riggs’s arguments.
B.

Discretion of Trial Courts to Make Restitution Determinations

Generally speaking, trial courts in Minnesota are granted
128
broad discretion over restitution awards. Riggs’s argument begins
with the notion that the trial court acted well within its broad
129
discretion to reduce the victim’s restitution award.
125. Id.; see infra Sections IV.C–D.
126. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 99, at *10; see also MINN. STAT.
§ 611A.045 (2016).
127. Kelzer v. Wachholz, 381 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984)) (“Intentional tort actions are not subject to the
comparative fault statute.”).
128. See Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 671 (citing Maidi, 537 N.W.2d at 284–86).
129. Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *10–14.
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At least one appellate case in Minnesota, State v. Ehrmantraut,
130
though unpublished and therefore non-precedential, lends some
support to Riggs’s argument. In State v. Ehrmantraut, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to reduce the
victim’s restitution award because the victim was the initial
131
aggressor. The defendant in the case was convicted of thirddegree assault for breaking the victim’s jaw after the victim showed
132
up at the defendant’s house and started a fight. Like the Riggs
trial court, the trial court in Ehrmantraut reduced the amount of
restitution because the victim provoked the conflict that led to his
133
injury. However, unlike Riggs, the court of appeals in Ehrmantraut
simply deferred to the trial court’s discretion without addressing
the deeper statutory issues involving the limits on trial courts to
134
consider factors outside of the statute, like the victim’s fault.
The trial courts in Riggs and Ehrmantraut departed from
precedent because trial courts in Minnesota have generally used
their discretionary authority to expand, rather than reduce,
135
restitution awards. The use of discretion to expand restitution
awards follows the broad statutory language addressing the victim’s
expenses and the defendant’s ability to pay. For example, in State v.
Maidi¸ the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a restitution award
of $147,251.27 for expenses incurred in rescuing an abducted
136
child, despite the mathematical impossibility of repayment. The
court concluded that section 609.26, subdivision 4, which provides
restitution for “any expense” incurred in the return of a child,
demonstrated the “legislative intent to give wide discretion to the

130. No. A09-880, 2010 WL 2035700 (Minn. Ct. App. May 25, 2010).
“Unpublished opinions of the Court of Appeals are not precedential.” MINN. STAT.
§ 480A.08, subdiv. 3(b) (2016).
131. 2010 WL 2035700, at *8 (“Despite some concern about the reasons
supporting reduced restitution . . . [w]e . . . do not interpret the restitution
adjustment necessarily to contradict the district court’s fact finding, but as the
district court’s discretionary reduction to acknowledge that Malone unreasonably
provoked the confrontation to which Ehrmantraut unreasonably responded.”).
132. Id. at *2.
133. Id. at *8.
134. Id. (relying on the trial court’s wide discretion in electing not to interpret
the restitution adjustment, rather than any statutory factors).
135. See, e.g., State v. Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d 668, 672 (Minn. 1999); State v.
Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995).
136. 537 N.W.2d at 285 (discussing the impossibility of repayment due to the
defendant’s low hourly wage and the effect of compound interest).
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sentencing court when ordering restitution.” The Maidi court
also compared section 611A.045, concerning the defendant’s
ability to pay, with section 611A.04, which authorizes trial courts to
138
order partial, full, or no restitution. Based on the broad language
in each statute, the court concluded that the legislature “intended
to give the courts wide flexibility to structure restitution orders that
139
take into account a defendant’s ability to pay.”
Additionally, in State v. Tenerelli, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that a restitution order for repayment of the cost of the
140
victim’s Hmong healing ceremony qualified as an appropriate
141
“economic loss” under section 611A.045. The court looked to
section 611A.04, which stated that compensable losses “may
include, but is not limited to, any out-of-pocket losses resulting
142
The court concluded that such language
from the crime.”
“clearly and unambiguously [left] the decision to award restitution
143
to the discretion of the trial court.” The Tenerelli court recognized
that section 611A.04 gives trial courts “significant discretion” over
restitution when it concerns expanding the scope of the victim’s
144
expenses.
An important distinction between Riggs, Maidi, and Tenerelli is
that the latter cases concern trial courts’ broad discretion over the
145
factors already identified in the restitution statute. Minnesota has
not recognized a trial court’s broad discretion to consider any
factor when awarding restitution. The Riggs trial court exceeded its
discretionary authority by considering factors beyond the factors
mentioned in the statute. This conclusion is reinforced by the
statutory analysis of section 611A.045.
C.

Minnesota Statutes Section 611A.045 Establishes Exclusive Criteria
for Determining Restitution

Upon analyzing section 611A.045, the Riggs court correctly
decided that the legislature enacted exclusive criteria. The Riggs
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 284.
Id. at 285–86.
Id.
Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 669.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 671 (citing MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (1999)).
Id. at 672.
Id. at 671.
See MINN. STAT. §§ 611A.045, .04 (2016).
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court applied statutory interpretation to evaluate section 611A.045
in light of the defendant’s claim that the statute did not restrict the
trial court from considering unspecified factors in determining
146
restitution.
1.

Canons of Statutory Interpretation

The court’s primary objective in statutory interpretation is
147
always to “effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Restitution
148
cases have reinforced this objective.
Questions of statutory
149
interpretation are reviewed de novo.
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine
150
whether a statute is ambiguous. A statute is ambiguous only
151
where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.
To determine whether a statute is capable of more than one
reasonable interpretation, the court may use a number of
152
The court first interprets the statute
interpretative steps.
according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its words and the
153
common rules of grammar. The statute is also read with the
presumption that all of its words have effect and none are
154
superfluous. The court interprets the statute’s meaning in the
context of the surrounding statutory sections to avoid conflicting

146. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015).
147. MINN. STAT. § 645.16; see Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682; State v. Jones, 848
N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014).
148. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682; State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 382
(Minn. 2011); State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011); Tenerelli, 598
N.W.2d at 671.
149. See Tenerelli, 598 N.W.2d at 671 (citing Doe v. Minn. State Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 435 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. 1989)).
150. See State v. Peck, 773 N.W.2d 768, 772 (Minn. 2009).
151. See State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007).
152. See MINN. STAT. § 645.08; Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682–83.
153. See MINN. STAT. § 645.08(1); State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn.
2014) (citing State v. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Minn. 2012)); Peck, 773 N.W.2d
at 772.
154. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (“Every law shall be construed, if possible, to
give effect to all its provisions.”); State v. Rick, 835 N.W.2d 478, 483 (Minn. 2013)
(citing Amaral v. St. Cloud Hosp., 598 N.W.2d 379, 384 (Minn. 1999)) (“Whenever
it is possible, no word, phrase, or sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or
insignificant.”); Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn.
2000).
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155

interpretations. Lastly, the court applies additional interpretative
156
157
canons identified in statutes or case law, where relevant.
After applying the interpretive steps, if the court determines
that a statute’s meaning is clear and unambiguous, it must apply
158
the plain meaning of the statute. The statute’s plain meaning is
159
presumed to convey the intent of the legislature. Only where the
court concludes that a statute is ambiguous may the court attempt
160
to discern the legislature’s intent through statutory construction.
2.

Application of Statutory Interpretation to Riggs’s Primary
Argument

The Riggs case illustrates the sometimes circuitous nature of
statutory interpretation. Two courts looked at the same statute and
took different conclusions regarding statutory interpretation: the
court of appeals concluded that section 611A.045, subdivision 1,
161
was ambiguous, while the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded

155. See Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. 2013) (citing
Martin v. Dicklich, 823 N.W.2d 336, 344 (Minn. 2012)) (“Multiple parts of a
statute may be read together so as to ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous.”);
State v. Gaiovnik, 794 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Christensen v.
Hennepin Transp. Co., Inc., 215 Minn. 394, 409, 10 N.W.2d 406, 415 (1943))
(“When interpreting statutes, we do not examine different provisions in isolation.
Instead, we construe a statute ‘as a whole,’ and ‘[w]ords and sentences are
understood . . . in the light of their context.’”); Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 277.
156. See MINN. STAT. § 645.08.
157. See, e.g., Rick, 835 N.W.2d at 485 (“Under the associated-words canon,
when context suggests that a group of words have something in common, each
word should be ascribed a meaning that is consistent with its accompanying
words.”); see also Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 436 (Minn.
2009) (discussing the application of canons of interpretation unless they would
defeat the legislature’s intent or result in a construction that is repugnant to
statute); Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d at 278 (citing Erickson v. Sunset Mem’l Park Ass’n,
259 Minn. 532, 543, 108 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1961)) (“[C]ourts should construe a
statute to avoid absurd results and unjust consequences.”).
158. See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Minn. 2011) (citing MINN.
STAT. § 645.16 (2010)).
159. See State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014) (citing Am. Tower,
L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001)).
160. See Rick, 835 N.W.2d at 482 (discussing Minnesota Statutes section 645.16
(2012) as listing canons of construction used to determine legislative intent for an
ambiguous statute).
161. See State v. Riggs, 845 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865
N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015).
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162

that it was not. However, despite the fact that the two courts took
different interpretive paths, each arrived at the same final
conclusion: the legislature intended the statutory factors to be the
163
exclusive criteria for determining restitution. In reaching their
conclusions, both courts applied a similar interpretative principle:
omitted phrases are presumed to be intentionally excluded by the
164
legislature.
The presumption that omissions in a statute are intentional is
165
known as the expressio unius canon. Expressio unius means that the
expression of one term implies the exclusion of the omitted
166
term. Courts often look to the canon when deciding whether the
language of a statute is exclusive or inclusive of things not
167
expressed. Under the canon, “[w]here a statute enumerates the
persons or things to be affected by its provisions, there is an
168
implied exclusion of others.” Expressio unius is not to be used in a

162. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685.
163. Id.; see also Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 239.
164. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685 (“[W]e cannot glean from the Legislature’s
omission its intention to include an unstated factor.”); Riggs, 845 N.W.2d at 238
(citing City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 811 N.W.2d 151,
159 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012)) (“Generally, when the legislature omits something
from a statute, we infer that the omission was intentional.”).
165. See State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011) (citing 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.25 (7th ed. 2007)) (“Expressio unius generally reflects an inference that any
omissions in a statute are intentional.”). The full Latin phrase is expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (“The expression of one thing is to the exclusion of another.”). See
id.
166. See id. (citing In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. 2010); In
re Common Sch. Dist. No. 1317, 263 Minn. 573, 575, 117 N.W.2d 390, 391 (1962)).
167. See, e.g., Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 383 (rejecting the inference of expressio
unius where the list of enumerated terms encompass the allegedly omitted term);
Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Minn. 2006)
(accepting the application of expressio unius where the contested term is not listed
among the various terms); Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 878 N.W.2d 521, 524–
25 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, No. A15-1711, 2017 WL 1364085 (Minn. Apr. 12,
2017) (rejecting the inference of expressio unius where the phrase “including”
prefaces a list of terms).
168. See City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge, 788 N.W.2d 522, 525 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010) (quoting Maytag Co. v. Comm’r of Taxation, 218 Minn. 460, 463, 17 N.W.2d
37, 40 (1944)), aff’d, 800 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 2011). See generally MINN. STAT.
§ 645.19 (2012); Niska v. Clayton, No. A13-0622, 2014 WL 902680, at *9 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 10, 2014) (citing Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d at 383), review denied, (June 25,
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1399 (2015).
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rote manner; it is highly context-dependent, and interpreting
courts must consider whether the statute reasonably expresses all it
169
was meant to prescribe. For statutory lists, expressio unius applies
when the “items expressed are members of an associated group or
series, justifying the inference that items not mentioned were
170
excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence.”
Minnesota courts commonly employ expressio unius to interpret
statutes, yet Minnesota’s case law is unclear as to precisely when
courts may apply it. Some courts have used expressio unius as a guide
to interpret the plain meaning of a statute; others have applied it
only after finding the statute ambiguous. For instance, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has used expressio unius both before
171
and after determining the ambiguity of a statute. Yet, in dicta, the
court suggested that expressio unius “is only used where it is first

169. See Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 535 n.3 (Minn. 2013) (citing
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 107 (2012)) (discussing that the application of expressio unius is greatly
dependent on context and common sense to determine whether the item(s)
specified can reasonably be thought to express all that the statute was intended to
grant or prohibit).
170. Mountain Peaks Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Roth-Steffen, 778 N.W.2d 380, 384
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168
(2003)).
171. See In re Xcel’s Request to Issue Renewable Dev. Fund Cycle 4 Requests
for Proposals, No. A14-1006, 2015 WL 2341257, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 18,
2015) (labeling expressio unius as a canon of construction that applies only if the
statute is ambiguous); RSR, Inc. v. Rothers, No. A13-1208, 2014 WL 996874, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2014) (applying expressio unius to interpret list of
provisions in Minnesota Statutes section 571.75, subdivision 1, after concluding
the statute was ambiguous); Mountain Peaks Fin. Servs., 778 N.W.2d at 384
(applying expressio unius as a rule of statutory construction only after concluding
the statutory list capable of two reasonable interpretations); BCBSM, Inc. v. Minn.
Comprehensive Health Ass’n, 713 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (applying
expressio unius as a rule of construction to determine legislative intent only after
concluding the statute was ambiguous). But see Persigehl v. Ridgebrook Invs. Ltd.
P’ship, 858 N.W.2d 824, 831–34 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (analyzing the applicability
of expressio unius in the process of determining that the statutory list was
unambiguous); City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Co-op. Power Ass’n, 811
N.W.2d 151, 159 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 830 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 2013)
(applying expressio unius to interpret the plain language of a four-factor statutory
list without first declaring the statute ambiguous); Underwood Grain Co. v.
Harthun, 563 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (relying on expressio unius as
a “principle of statutory construction” to reject inserting an omitted phrase into a
list of statutory provisions and concluding the statute was unambiguous).
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172

determined that the language is ambiguous.”
Likewise, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has called expressio unius a “canon of
173
174
construction” to be used only if a statute is ambiguous. At other
times, however, the court has used expressio unius to interpret plain
175
meaning. Nevertheless, the confusion surrounding expressio unius
ultimately may be a distinction without a difference. Whether
expressio unius is applied before or after determining the ambiguity
of a statute, the conclusion it led to in Riggs was well-founded.
In Riggs, the court did not specifically announce that it relied
176
on the expressio unius canon to reach its conclusion. Indeed, the
court staked much of its reasoning on the rules of grammar and
177
past precedent. However, the expressio unius principle underlies
172. See Walser Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Richfield, 635 N.W.2d 391, 397
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Colangelo v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 598 N.W.2d
14, 17–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)), aff’d, 644 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 2002).
173. See Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 718–19 (Minn. 2014).
174. See Billion v. Comm’r of Revenue, 827 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Minn. 2013)
(citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)) (explaining
that canons of construction are inapplicable unless a statute is ambiguous).
175. See Gams v. Houghton, No. A14-1747, 2016 WL 4536500, at *3–4 (Minn.
Aug. 31, 2016) (citing City of Saint Paul v. Eldredge, 800 N.W.2d 643, 648 (Minn.
2011)) (relying on the “maxim that when there is an express enumeration of the
persons or things to be affected by a particular provision, ‘there is an implied
exclusion of others’” in concluding that the statute was unambiguous); Rohmiller
v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590–91 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Wallace v. Comm’r of
Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 230, 184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971)) (concluding that
where a statute identified the class of persons to which its rule applied, the court
“cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or inadvertently
overlooks,” and holding that the statute is not ambiguous where the legislature is
silent); Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 175, 84 N.W.2d
593, 599–600 (1957) (concluding that the provisions of a contract were exclusive
and unambiguous after applying expressio unius and declaring that the canon is
applicable to statutes as well); cf. In re Welfare of J.B., 782 N.W.2d 535, 543 (Minn.
2010) (applying expressio unius to interpret the statute as not requiring public
defender representation of parents in a juvenile proceeding while later declaring
legislative history inapplicable unless a statute is ambiguous). But see In re
Guardianship of Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d 728, 749–50 (Minn. 2014) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the applicability of canons of construction, like expressio
unius, only where the statute is ambiguous).
176. See generally State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015).
177. The Riggs court relied on its statutory interpretation in State v. Hohenwald
for the conclusion that whenever the legislature used the article “the”—as in, “the
following factors”—it necessarily intended to create an exclusive list. However, the
court’s use of Hohenwald appears to be dubious because Riggs extrapolates
Hohenwald’s analysis from the singular to plural. Hohenwald addressed whether the
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its analysis. Because expressio unius is context-dependent, courts
typically test its exclusionary presumption by scanning the
surrounding statutory language for any inclusive terms or other
indicators that the scope of the statute includes unexpressed
179
Likewise, the Riggs court announced that, as an
items.
interpretive step, it would consider the statute as a whole and
interpret section 611A.045 in context with the surrounding
180
This interpretive step demonstrates the
statutory provisions.
court’s use of the expressio unius canon.
The Riggs court followed the proper analytical steps for testing
the expressio unius exclusionary presumption against the language
181
of the statute and the surrounding statutory context. The court
first looked to section 611A.045 and concluded that there was no
inclusive language, such as “the district court shall consider at least
the following factors” or “among the factors that the district court
shall consider are,” to indicate that additional factors could be
182
considered. The court then analyzed the surrounding statutes,
section 611A.04 (authorizing restitution orders) and section
611A.54 (addressing state-funded reparations for victims of
183
crime). Interpreting section 611A.04, the statute immediately
preceding section 611A.045, the court reasoned that the legislature

article “the” provided an exclusive meaning for a single item in a list and not
whether the article “the” provided an exclusive meaning over an entire list of
factors. See id. at 685 (quoting State v. Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn.
2012)) (“We held in Hohenwald that ‘[t]he definite article “the” is a word of
limitation that indicates a reference to a specific object.’”); Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d
at 830 (“The use of the word ‘the’ before ‘criminal proceedings’ in Rule 20.01
provides further evidence that the suspension order entered by the district court
affected only the case already initiated against Hohenwald by criminal complaint.
The definite article ‘the’ is a word of limitation that indicates a reference to a
specific object.”).
178. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 169, at 107.
179. See, e.g., Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590–91(Minn. 2012); Nelson
v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 456–57 (Minn. 2006).
180. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 683.
181. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 169; see also Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 591
(holding that a statute that expressly provided rights for identified category of
individuals but was silent as to other categories of individuals was not ambiguous
after applying the principle that courts cannot supply words that the legislature
has intentionally omitted by examining surrounding statutory provisions for
context).
182. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 684.
183. Id. at 685.
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used the words “may include, but is not limited to” to create an
184
inclusive, rather than exclusive, statutory list. Interpreting section
611A.54, the court concluded that a victim’s contributory
misconduct is expressly listed as a factor in determining victim
185
reparations.
To the Riggs court, the statutory context surrounding section
611A.045 illustrated the language available to the legislature. Had
the legislature intended the restitution statute to permit the
consideration of additional factors, it would have indicated its
intention by using broad or inclusive language such as “includes”
186
or “at least” to introduce the restitution criteria. Based on this
context, the Riggs court applied the expressio unius principle, stating
that “[w]ithout more, we cannot glean from the Legislature’s
187
omission its intention to include an unstated factor.” On that
basis, the court found the meaning of the statute unambiguous and
188
exclusive.
Other Minnesota case law discussing statutory interpretation
reinforces the court’s analysis. For example, in Nelson v. Productive
Alternatives, Inc., the parties disputed whether Minnesota Statutes
chapter 317A, which grants certain protections for members of
nonprofit corporations, also protects against retaliatory
189
termination. The court reviewed the provisions of the chapter
and found no language indicative of protection against
190
retaliation. The court then applied expressio unius to conclude
that the statute demonstrated the legislature’s intent to not offer

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
2006).
190.

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Nelson v. Productive Alternatives, Inc., 715 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Minn.
Id. at 456–57.
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191

such protection. The court held that the legislature, not the
192
court, would have to make any future modifications to the law.
Rohmiller v. Hart is another statutory interpretation case that,
like Riggs, applied expressio unius. In Rohmiller, the plaintiff argued
that Minnesota Statutes section 257C.08 was ambiguous because it
expressly provided minor child visitation rights to a subset of
193
individuals, but it was silent as to the visitation rights of aunts.
The court looked to the various provisions of the statute and found
that the statute delineated the visitation rights of many categories
194
While not
of individuals and made no mention of aunts.
specifically announcing application of expressio unius, the court
relied on its underlying principle: omissions are presumed
195
The court concluded that the statute was
intentional.
unambiguous and reflected the legislature’s intent to not include
196
aunts among those individuals with visitation rights.
Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co. is a contract
interpretation case that also used expressio unius to reach the
conclusion that terms not expressed should not be
197
acknowledged. In Anderson, the parties disputed whether the
term “layoff” in their labor agreement also encompassed a
198
“discharge.” The court relied on the expressio unius exclusionary
principle to guide its reasoning that the recognition of discharge
would impermissibly modify the contract by creating an
199
unexpressed exception. In a similar fashion, the Riggs court

191. Id. at 457 (“[W]e abide by the canon of statutory construction ‘expressio
unius exclusio alterius,’ meaning the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another . . . . That is, since the legislature has extensively expressed the rights and
privileges of membership in a nonprofit corporation, and since protection from
reprisal employment discharge is not among these express protections, we must
conclude that the legislature meant not to protect members from such
practices.”).
192. Id.
193. Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012).
194. Id. at 590–91.
195. Id. at 591 (quoting Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 230,
184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971)).
196. Id.
197. See Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 175–76, 84
N.W.2d 593, 599 (1957) (“This [exclusionary] rule is applicable to contracts as
well as to statutes . . . .”).
198. See id. at 173, 84 N.W.2d at 597.
199. See id. at 175–76, 84 N.W.2d at 599.
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declined to recognize comparative fault, in part, because it would
200
impermissibly modify section 611A.045.
A number of statutory interpretation cases demonstrate the
type of inclusive language that overcomes the exclusionary
presumption of expressio unius. Had the Riggs court found any such
inclusive language surrounding section 611A.045, it would have
been justified in reaching a different conclusion. For instance, in
Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
declined to apply expressio unius to a list of statutory criteria because
201
the statute introduced the criteria using the word “including.”
This term, according to the court, demonstrated the legislature’s
202
intent that the statutory list be non-exclusive. In a similar case,
City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Co-op, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that expressio unius did not apply to a four-factor statute
because the statute introduced the factors using the words “must
include” and featured a catch-all fourth factor, “other appropriate
203
Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v.
factors.”
Caldwell, held that the presumption of expressio unis is overcome
when the supposed omitted term is obviously encompassed by the
204
enumerated terms of a statute. The statute at issue in Riggs
contained no similarly broad or inclusive language.
In summary, the relevant statutory context reinforces, rather
than overcomes, the application of expressio unius for interpreting
section 611A.045 in Riggs. Moreover, section 611A.045 and its
surrounding statutes lack any indicators of inclusive language or
205
Furthermore, section 611A.54 provides an additional
intent.
point of reference where the legislature expressly adopted the
victim’s contributory fault as a factor in the similar reparations
206
statute. Thus, as the Riggs court correctly determined, application
of the exclusionary principle leads to the conclusion that the
factors listed in section 611A.045 are intentionally exclusive.

200. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 686 n.8 (Minn. 2015).
201. Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 878 N.W.2d 521, 524 (Minn. Ct. App.
2016), aff’d, No. A15-1711, 2017 WL 1364085 (Minn. Apr. 12, 2017).
202. Id. at 524–25.
203. See City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Coop. Power Ass’n, 830 N.W.2d
32, 39 (Minn. 2013).
204. State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011).
205. See supra notes 178–85.
206. See supra note 180.
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Minnesota Statutes Section 611A.045 Does Not Incorporate
Comparative Fault Causation into Restitution Calculations

This section addresses Riggs’s alternative argument. As
detailed earlier, Riggs argued that even if the factors listed in the
statute are exclusive, the statute’s express language still triggers the
causation analysis typically used in civil cases, which, in turn, allows
207
consideration of comparative fault.
Riggs was correct to argue that in spite of the statute’s
exclusive restitution criteria, the language of the statute still
requires the trial court to analyze causation in order to determine
whether the victim’s losses are, in fact, the result of the offender’s
crime. The pertinent question is: what kind of causation test
applies to restitution? Restitution cases in Minnesota make clear
that trial courts should apply a causation test reminiscent of the
208
proximate cause test in civil law. Just as the Chief Justice reasoned
in her dissent, Riggs asserted that such a causation test necessarily
209
includes the victim’s comparative fault. As the following analysis
will show, the Riggs court rightly recognized that reading
comparative fault into the statute was a bridge too far. Before
examining Riggs’s alternative argument, it is necessary to
understand how courts in Minnesota have analyzed and applied
causation in the restitution context.
1.

Restitution Requires a Proximate Causal Link Between the
Victim’s Losses and the Course of the Offender’s Criminal
Conduct

Minnesota’s restitution statute does not identify a particular
210
causation test. As previously stated, section 611A.045, subdivision
1(a), simply directs the trial court to determine the value of the
211
economic loss sustained by the victim “as a result of the offense.”
Section 611A.04 defines the victim’s losses in a similar fashion—
207. See Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *13–14.
208. See infra notes 222–30 and accompanying text.
209. State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 686–87 (Minn. 2015) (Gildea, C.J.,
dissenting); Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 98, at *12.
210. Compare MINN. STAT. § 611A.04 (2016), and id. § 611A.045, with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259 (b)(3)(f) (2016) (mandating federal restitution for the losses of sexual
exploitation victims sustained “as a proximate result of the offense”). See also
Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2014) (holding that 18 U.S.C.
§ 2259 creates a proximate cause requirement).
211. See MINN. STAT. § 611A.045.

168

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1
212

compensable losses are the losses “resulting from the crime.”
Courts have interpreted this language to require the state to prove
that the victim’s losses are “directly caused by the [offender’s
213
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has
criminal] conduct.”
214
referred to this relationship as a “direct causal link.” Applying this
standard, the trial judge must ensure that the record establishes a
215
factual basis for the restitution award that connects the victim’s
216
loss to the crime.
Under this approach, restitution may be ordered “only for
losses directly caused by [the] actions” for which the defendant was
217
convicted. At first glance, it may seem that restitution is allowed
only for those losses caused by the specific offense for which the
defendant is convicted. Indeed, Justice Page focused much of his
218
Riggs dissent upon this point. However, from early on, Minnesota
courts have taken a broad view of the offender’s criminal conduct,
in which restitution is appropriate for losses arising from any part
of a single course of criminal conduct, regardless of the specific
219
offense of conviction.
212. See id. § 611A.04, subdiv. 1(a).
213. State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting
State v. Latimer, 604 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)); State v. Nelson, 796
N.W.2d 343, 347 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (same); see also State v. Olson, 381 N.W.2d
899, 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
214. See Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d at 852.
215. See Latimer, 604 N.W.2d at 105 (citing State v. Fader, 358 N.W.2d 42, 48
(Minn. 1984)).
216. See Nelson, 796 N.W.2d at 347 (citing Latimer, 604 N.W.2d at 105).
217. Id.; see also Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d at 852; Olson, 381 N.W.2d at 901.
218. Justice Page argued that the only reasonable plain language
interpretation of “offense” from section 611A.045 is the offense of conviction. For
support, Page pointed to section 611A.04, a surrounding statute, which conditions
restitution on whether the offender is convicted. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d
679, 688 (Minn. 2015) (Page, J., dissenting).
219. See, e.g., State v. Terpstra, 546 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Minn. 1996) (confirming
that the total amount of restitution is not limited by the crime of conviction
because as long as the defendant is convicted of a related crime and the victim’s
losses are established by a preponderance of the evidence, the restitution order is
proper); Latimer, 604 N.W.2d at 105–06 (reversing trial court’s restitution order
because Latimer’s acts were separate from the murder and Latimer could only be
ordered to pay restitution for expenses directly caused by Latimer’s participation
in the concealment of the murder); State v. Esler, 553 N.W.2d 61, 63–65 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1996) (reversing the trial court’s restitution order because a restitution
order for losses arising from multiple offenses must be linked to the crime of
conviction by the same behavior); Olson, 381 N.W.2d at 900 (affirming the
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Case law in Minnesota demonstrates that the causation test for
restitution has evolved over time. Initially, courts applied a but-for
test to the causal relationship between the victim’s losses and the
offender’s conduct. Eventually, however, courts began to use a
causation test similar to the proximate cause test used in civil law.
220
Prior to State v. Palubicki, Minnesota courts assessed the
causal link between a victim’s loss and the offender’s crime using a
221
but-for test. But-for causation means that a later event would not
222
have occurred “but for” the former event.
Under but-for
causation, the court asked whether, under identical circumstances,
223
the injury would occur absent the offender’s crime.
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected but-for
causation as the state’s causation standard for restitution in State v.
224
Palubicki. In Palubicki, the trial court granted restitution to the
children of a murder victim for their lodging and travel expenses
225
related to attending the defendant’s murder trial. Relying on
precedent, the state argued that the expenses were the but-for
226
result of the defendant’s offense. The defendant urged the court
227
to limit the scope of restitution claims. The court agreed, and in
rejecting the but-for test, the court held that a restitution claim “so
attenuated in its cause that it cannot be said to result from the

restitution order because the trial evidence directly linked the business’s losses to
the defendant’s burglary and reasoning that if the defendant had been acquitted
of a theft involving a separate incident from the burglary, the restitution order
would be improper).
220. 727 N.W.2d 662 (2007).
221. See State v. Hillbrant, No. A05-820, 2006 WL 2052872, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 25, 2006) (citing In re Welfare of D.D.G., 532 N.W.2d 279, 282–83 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1995)) (“Minnesota courts apply a but-for analysis when considering
whether a victim’s economic harm was directly caused by a defendant’s criminal
conduct.”), abrogated by Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662; State v. O’Brien, 459 N.W.2d
131, 134–35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
222. But-For Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[But-for cause
is] [t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred.Also termed
actual cause; cause in fact; factual cause.”); see also Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct.
1710, 1722 (2014).
223. See George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2006) (citing W.
PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 265 (5th
ed. 1984)).
224. Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 667.
225. Id. at 664–65.
226. Id. at 667.
227. Id. at 666.
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228

defendant’s criminal act” violates the statute. Still, applying this
standard, the court affirmed the restitution order, concluding that
the trial attendance expenses were not too attenuated and were the
229
“direct result of [Palubicki’s] crime.”
The Palubicki holding signified the court’s acceptance of
“direct cause” rather than but-for cause as the causation standard
230
Direct cause, after Palubicki, is
for restitution in Minnesota.
231
synonymous with proximate cause in civil law. Proximate cause
generally requires, first, the existence of but-for cause, and second,
a direct relationship between the injury and the harmful conduct,
such that the injury is not so attenuated from the conduct that the
232
injury “is more aptly described as mere fortuity.” However, as this
Note will discuss in greater detail, contrary to Riggs’s argument,
proximate cause in the restitution context does not necessarily
require the inclusion of comparative fault.
Perhaps because Palubicki provided no examples of the types of
233
so far, with rare
restitution claims that should be rejected,
exception, few restitution awards following Palubicki have been
reversed because the victim’s loss was too attenuated from the
234
defendant’s conduct. Post-Palubicki cases have applied proximate
228. Id. at 667.
229. See id.
230. After rejecting but-for causation, the Palubicki court used the term,
“direct result of,” to test the attenuation of the disputed restitution award. Id. The
term “direct result” is synonymous with proximate cause, as used in civil liability in
Minnesota. See George v. Estate of Baker, 724 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2006) (citing 4
MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, CIVIL,
CIVJIG 27.10 (4th ed. 1999)) (“Minnesota applies the substantial factor test for
causation. The negligent act is a direct, or proximate, cause of harm if the act was a
substantial factor in the harm’s occurrence.” (emphasis added)).
231. See 4 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS’N, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTION
GUIDES, CIVIL, CIVJIG 27.10 (6th ed. 2015), Westlaw.
232. See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2014) (quoting
Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 838–39 (1996)).
233. See generally Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d 662.
234. See Powell v. State, No. A14-1406, 2015 WL 4393381, at *6 (Minn. Ct.
App. July 20, 2015) (ordering partial reversal of restitution order for over-thecounter drugs, improperly included in restitution for prescription costs, as too
attenuated). But see State v. Rodriguez, 863 N.W.2d 424, 430 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015)
(holding restitution for victim’s moving expenses not too attenuated because of
psychological trauma from defendant’s break-in), review denied, (July 21, 2015);
Martel v. State, No. A14-2156, 2015 WL 4171887, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. July 13,
2015) (holding restitution for victim’s colonoscopy to examine diarrhea symptoms
following defendant’s indecent exposure not too attenuated); State v. Berkness,
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235

cause to test the restitution award.
For example, several
unpublished court of appeals cases have held that the victim’s loss
“must be ‘a reasonably foreseeable result of, and [be] directly
236
caused by, [a defendant’s] actions.’” Notably, however, neither
Palubicki nor any restitution case following Palubicki specifically
addressed the comparative fault of a victim in the proximate direct
237
cause analysis.
In addition to the proximate cause test recognized in Palubicki,
other restitution cases demonstrate that trial courts may also
238
consider multiple causes in their analysis of the victim’s losses.
However, as with the Palubicki line of cases, no restitution case has
gone as far as to recognize the fault of the victim as a potential
contributory cause. For example, in State v. Nelson, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals assessed multiple causes when determining the
factual connection between the victim’s loss and the offender’s
239
conduct. In Nelson, a tanning salon employee pled guilty to one
misdemeanor for theft from the salon and was ordered to pay
240
restitution. Charges were also brought against three coworkers
241
but later dismissed. The court of appeals modified the restitution
order because the order impermissibly included losses that flowed

No. A14-1678, 2015 WL 1608992, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2015), review
denied, (June 16, 2015) (holding restitution for victim’s medical treatment from
bite of defendant’s non-immunized dog not too attenuated); State v. Shakibi, No.
A14-0242, 2014 WL 6609082, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2014) (holding that
restitution for damage to car driven but not owned by victim not too attenuated
from defendant’s reckless driving crime); State v. Alford, No. A07-1025, 2008 WL
4006657, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2008) (holding restitution for fire damage
to mobile home from fire set by defendant’s brother to cover murder not too
attenuated because both participated in the murder); State v. Spann, No. A052372, 2007 WL 968421, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2007) (holding restitution
for stolen car, lost due to police auction, not too attenuated from criminal’s initial
theft of car).
235. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 863 N.W.2d at 429 (citing Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at
667); Berkness, 2015 WL 1608992, at *2; Alford, 2008 WL 4006657, at *7.
236. Powell, 2015 WL 4393381, at *3 (quoting State v. Maxwell, 802 N.W.2d
849, 853 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011)); see also Berkness, 2015 WL 1608992, at *2; Shakibi,
2014 WL 6609082, at *3; Spann, 2007 WL 968421, at *3.
237. See generally Palubicki, 727 N.W.2d at 662.
238. This point went unacknowledged by the Riggs court. See State v. Riggs,
865 N.W.2d 679, 679 (Minn. 2015).
239. See State v. Nelson, 796 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
240. See id. at 348.
241. Id.
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directly from the coworkers’ conduct rather than the defendant’s
242
conduct.
Additionally, in State v. Spann, an unpublished Minnesota
Court of Appeals case, the defendant was convicted of car theft and
243
ordered to pay restitution to the victim. Upon recovering the
victim’s car, the police refused to return it to the victim because he
lacked insurance, and the police subsequently auctioned the stolen
244
vehicle and kept the proceeds. At the restitution hearing, the trial
judge said to the defendant, “As far as restitution is concerned . . .
I’m not going to order that you pay the full purchase price of the
245
car, Mr. Spann. I just don’t think it’s fair.” The court of appeals
affirmed the restitution award, reasoning that partial restitution was
justified because a portion of the victim’s losses may have been
246
caused by the police rather than the defendant.
However, State v. Miller presents a counterpoint, suggesting
that when in doubt, courts should favor the victim over the
247
defendant in their causation analysis. Miller held that the trial
court is not required to tie specific losses to the actions of a single
defendant where the victim’s losses were caused by multiple
248
individuals. In the case, Miller and another individual teamed up
to fight and injure a victim and were then convicted and ordered to
249
pay joint restitution.
Although the trial court could not
determine which specific injuries were caused by Miller, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order, holding
that the victim’s right to restitution outweighed the offender’s right
not to pay for an injury that may have been caused by another
250
offender. Applied here, Miller weighs against Riggs’s odds of
persuading the court to recognize the victim’s role as a
contributing cause.

242. Id.
243. See State v. Spann, No. A05-2372, 2007 WL 968421, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 3, 2007).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See id. at *3–4.
247. State v. Miller, 842 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014).
248. Id. at 478.
249. Id.
250. See id.
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Application of Causation Analysis to Riggs’s Alternative
Argument

Riggs’s alternative argument boiled down to his assertion that
251
the victim’s loss was not entirely the result of his criminal conduct.
Although Riggs made a colorable argument that traditional civillaw-style causation analysis, and therefore comparative fault, was
encompassed by the statutory term “as a result of the offense,” the
252
court wisely declined to read comparative fault into the statute.
To succeed, Riggs would have needed to convince the court not
only to apply Palubicki’s proximate cause but also to take the
unprecedented step of recognizing the victim’s comparative fault
within its causation analysis.
While it is not apparent why the majority declined to apply the
proximate cause test recognized by Palubicki and other case law, it is
unlikely to have made a difference in Riggs’s favor. Indeed, rather
than test the proximate causal link between the victim’s losses and
Riggs’s crime, the majority appeared to revert back to using the
but-for test where any loss arising from the sequence of events
253
involving the defendant’s crime is subject to restitution.
Nonetheless, it seems likely that under either causation test, Riggs’s
stabbing of D.S. would be considered both a but-for cause and a
proximate cause of D.S.’s injuries. Therefore, even if the Riggs
court had applied the causation test under Palubicki, Riggs’s
argument still hinged on persuading the court that such
“traditional” causation tests necessarily include consideration of the
victim’s comparative fault.
The traditional causation analysis applicable to Minnesota’s
civil liability law does incorporate comparative fault; however, it
does not follow that criminal restitution is a proper forum for
comparative fault simply because restitution also uses a proximate
cause test. First, unlike criminal restitution, comparative fault is
expressly identified in Minnesota’s civil liability statute and

251. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 687 (Minn. 2015) (Gildea, C.J.,
dissenting).
252. See, e.g., State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2011) (holding
that the meaning of a particular term in a statute may encompass additional
meanings and terms, even where the statute is otherwise exclusive).
253. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685–86 (majority opinion) (interpreting the
phrase “as a result of the offense” to signify consequences that follow naturally
from a particular action).
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254

therefore endorsed by the legislature. Second, as the majority
recognized, the fatal flaw in the Chief Justice’s reasoning in her
255
dissent is that in Minnesota’s civil law, comparative fault applies
only to actions for negligent conduct, whereas comparative fault is
256
inapplicable to intentionally tortious conduct.
Intentional torts of the kind in which Riggs engaged, like
assault or battery, are not subject to Minnesota’s comparative fault
257
258
and contrary to Riggs’s requested remedy,
civil
statute,
defendants in those intentional tort cases cannot reduce their
damages by seeking to apportion a share of the fault to the victim.
Because Riggs committed an intentional act, it is incorrect to argue
that because the restitution statute permits “traditional causation
analysis” (i.e., proximate cause), it must also permit comparative
fault. Even if the court used a civil law approach to assess proximate
cause at Riggs’s restitution hearing, the victim’s comparative fault
should have no bearing on the court’s holding because the
conduct at issue was intentional and not negligent. In a
hypothetical civil assault case, the only option available to Riggs
259
would have been to raise an affirmative defense.
254. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2016).
255. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 686–87 (Gildea, C.J., dissenting) (urging the
majority to apply a “traditional causation analysis,” which, under Minnesota’s civil
law, includes the victim’s comparative fault).
256. Id. at 686 n.8 (majority opinion) (citing Lambrecht v. Schreyer, 129
Minn. 271, 274, 152 N.W. 645, 646 (1915)) (“Contributory negligence is a defense
only in cases where the action is founded on the negligence of the defendant. It is
not a defense to an action for assault.”); see also MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (“‘Fault’
includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the
person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort
liability.”).
257. Kelzer v. Wachholz, 381 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1984)) (“Intentional tort actions are not subject to the
comparative fault statute.”).
258. See Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 685–86; Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, supra
note 98, at *12.
259. Whether or not Riggs could have raised an affirmative defense at his
restitution hearing presents another question. The only appellate case addressing
the availability of an affirmative defense in a restitution hearing is an unpublished
case, State v. Graham. No. C1-02-887, 2003 WL 282470 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 11,
2003). The defendant in Graham pleaded guilty to shooting and killing a dog and,
at the restitution hearing, tried to raise a statutory justification for the killing. Id. at
*1. The court held that the defendant lost the opportunity to assert an affirmative
defense at the restitution hearing by pleading guilty to the underlying crime. Id. at
*3–4. The Graham court reasoned that it would be an absurd result for an offender
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Apportionment of fault, or comparative fault, is a civil law
260
concept that is strictly tied to negligence. Because comparative
fault does not exist for intentional torts, by arguing that section
611A.045 encompassed comparative fault, Riggs essentially asked
the court to recognize a new legal creation. The court rightly
declined. To Riggs’s point, while section 611A.045 does permit trial
courts to assess causation under the proximate cause standard and
consider multiple causes, the court should not read in non-existent
features of civil liability, unless expressly authorized by the
legislature.
E.

The Policy Issues Raised by Riggs Are Properly Deferred to the
Legislature

The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly decided the Riggs
case under Minnesota’s restitution law as it exists today; however,
there may be good reason for the legislature to incorporate
comparative fault into the restitution statutes in the future. In fact,
Riggs raises potential public policy considerations that support
incorporating comparative fault into restitutionfor instance,
261
basic fairness. The few Minnesota trial courts that have reduced
restitution awards under circumstances similar to Riggs seem to be
to admit guilt in one phase of the criminal proceeding and, in a later phrase,
argue the opposite to challenge the restitution order. See id. at *3.
Based on the limited amount of non-precedential case law, it would appear
that offenders cannot raise affirmative defenses in restitution hearings. The issue
would be one of first impression; but Riggs did not argue it, and the court was
under no obligation to consider it. In Riggs’s case, he waived his right to claim selfdefense in the criminal phase when he accepted the plea deal. See State v. Riggs,
845 N.W.2d 236, 237 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 2015).
Then, at his restitution hearing, Riggs called the trial court’s attention to the fact
that he was not raising an affirmative defense to challenge the restitution order,
seemingly to avoid any comparison with Graham. See Defendant’s Restitution
Memorandum, supra note 86, at 4. In the restitution order, the trial court stated
that it did not consider self-defense or any affirmative defense from Riggs in its
decision to reduce the restitution award by apportioning some of the fault to the
victim. See State v. Riggs, No. 85-CR-12-960, 2013 WL 9348661, at *2 (Minn. Dist.
Ct. June 7, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d, 865 N.W.2d
679 (Minn. 2015).
260. See MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subdiv. 1 (2016).
261. See, e.g., State v. Spann, No. A05-2372, 2007 WL 968421, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 3, 2007) (“As far as restitution is concerned . . . I’m not going to order
that you pay the full purchase price on the car, Mr. Spann. I just don’t think it’s
fair.”).
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motivated by the perceived injustice of ordering full restitution to a
victim whose actions unreasonably provoked the chain of events
leading to his injury. Compensating such victims does not serve the
purpose of restitution, nor does it create the right incentives.
Restitution should discourage, rather than encourage, the type
of dangerous conduct in which the Riggs victim engaged. By way of
example, in an Arizona case, the supervisor of a care center and
her employee were transporting three disabled patients in a work
262
van. During the trip, the supervisor provided the driver, her
263
employee, with multiple alcoholic beverages. On the return trip,
the driver lost control of the vehicle and rolled it, severely injuring
264
the supervisor and others. The trial court refused to order
restitution to the supervisor because she was partially at fault for
265
her own injuries. However, the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed
the order because, like the Minnesota statute, Arizona’s criminal
266
restitution law did not permit consideration of victim fault. If
Arizona’s restitution law had allowed for consideration of the
victim’s fault, the unfair result of a criminally dangerous victim
receiving significant mandatory restitution could have been
avoided.
Some state legislatures have addressed victim fault within the
context of their restitution statutes. Some states permit a victim’s
comparative fault to be considered during the restitution
267
268
hearing; other states do not. The states that have recognized
comparative fault have generally used explicit or inclusive statutory
262. State v. Clinton, 890 P.2d 74, 74–75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 75.
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. See People v. Millard, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 751, 757–59 (Ct. App. 2009); City
of Whitefish v. Jentile, 285 P.3d 515, 519 (Mont. 2012) (concluding that the
defendant could raise the defense of comparative negligence at the restitution
hearing); State v. Laycock, 214 P.3d 104, 113 (Utah 2009) (holding that issues of
comparative negligence may be relevant in determining restitution).
268. See People v. Johnson, 780 P.2d 504, 507 (Colo. 1989) (holding that the
restitution statute does not require the sentencing court to determine a
defendant’s criminal liability for restitution in accordance with comparative
negligence and rules applicable to a civil case); State v. Wagner, 484 N.W.2d 212,
216 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (holding that comparative fault principles do not apply
to restitution for criminal acts under Iowa Code chapter 910); State v. Knoll, 614
N.W.2d 20, 25 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the defendant may not “raise
contributory negligence as a defense to restitution”).
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language that clearly authorizes consideration of non-enumerated
269
factors during restitution hearings. For example, at least one state
statute enumerates “the contributory misconduct of the victim” as a
270
factor that courts must consider for restitution. Unlike states that
authorize comparative fault for restitution, Minnesota’s restitution
271
statute lacks similarly explicit or inclusive language.
At the federal level, the crime victim restitution statutes also
contain express, inclusive language permitting courts to consider
272
“such other factors as the court deems appropriate.” Minnesota’s
legislature should consider adopting a similarly flexible approach.
Up to this point, Minnesota’s legislature has elected not to
incorporate comparative fault in its restitution statutes, but it has
done so for the Crime Victims Reparations Program. Criminal
reparations and criminal restitution serve analogous policy
objectives. If Minnesota’s legislature was guided by similar public
273
it is not apparent why the legislature
policy considerations,
decided to include comparative fault in criminal reparations and
not in criminal restitution. Perhaps, as some commentators have
cautioned, the legislature was concerned that integrating
comparative fault with criminal restitution would risk turning
274
restitution hearings into lengthy civil-liability-like mini-trials.

269. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 893 of 2016
Reg. Sess. and Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2d Ex. Sess.) (“[T]he court shall consider any
relevant factors, including, but not limited to . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-243
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“‘Pecuniary loss’ means: (a) all special
damages, but not general damages, substantiated by evidence in the record, that a
person could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the facts
or events constituting the offender’s criminal activities . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-38a-102(6) (West, Westlaw through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.) (“‘Pecuniary
damages’ means all demonstrable economic injury, whether or not yet incurred,
including those which a person could recover in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant’s criminal activities . . . .”).
270. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1325, subdiv. 1 (West, Westlaw through
2015 2d Reg. Sess.).
271. See MINN. STAT. § 611A.045 (2016).
272. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (2012).
273. See MINN. STAT. § 611A.54, subdiv. 2.
274. See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 99, at *11; Shephard, supra note 66, at
820–21 (“In order to account for victim fault in calculating the restitution award,
the court would have to create a new post-guilt proceeding. Once the guilt phase
of the trial has been concluded, the court would next have to initiate a hearing or
proceeding to evaluate fault and determine restitution. This means that the victim
would have to return to court to hear and testify about evidence concerning the

178

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1

However, given the similarities between reparations and
restitution, and based on the seemingly unfair but legally correct
outcome of the Riggs decision, the legislature should revisit the
policy choices at work in Minnesota’s criminal restitution scheme.
In order to discourage dangerous or provocative conduct on the
part of potential victims and to ensure fairness for defendants in
situations where a victim provokes a conflict, the legislature should
consider two options to update restitution.
For one, the Minnesota legislature could incorporate express
language allowing comparative fault to be considered in restitution
determinations by borrowing the express language from
Minnesota’s reparations statute. The crime victim reparations
statute provides, “reparations shall be denied or reduced to the
extent, if any, that the board deems reasonable because of the
275
contributory misconduct of the [victim].” The legislature could
incorporate this language from the reparations statute into the
restitution statute, section 611A.045, and grant discretion to the
trial judge to determine the victim’s responsibility and adjust the
restitution award accordingly. Under this option, comparative
fault—or contributory misconduct, as it is called in section
611A.54—would also be a factor that trial courts would have broad
discretion to apply. Statutory recognition of the trial judge’s broad
discretion over comparative fault would alleviate some of the risk of
restitution hearings becoming civil mini-trials.
Alternatively, if the legislature decided that incorporating
comparative fault into restitution undermined the traditional
relationships in civil law between intentional conduct, negligence,
and comparative fault, a second option would be to allow a
276
defendant to avail herself of affirmative defenses. Affirmative
defenses should include self-defense and assumption of the risk,
even if the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted. These defenses
would help to discourage potential victims from provoking fights or

offender’s fault and the victim’s own fault, essentially creating a mini-trial. The
mini-trial would focus on the victim’s conduct and alleged fault, which unlike the
defendant’s conduct, has not been presented to a jury and has not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the mini-trial would juxtapose the victim’s
alleged fault, which has not been proven, with the defendant’s fault that has been
proven.”).
275. MINN. STAT. § 611A.54, subdiv. 2.
276. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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engaging in dangerous conduct, such as providing alcohol to their
drivers.
In the end, these decisions are best left to the legislature. The
judiciary has recognized time and again that policy questions are
277
for the legislature to decide. With respect to the restitution
statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court has had the occasion to
address difficult policy choices and has declined to create
278
exceptions to the statute. Courts must apply the law that the
279
legislature writes. By declining to read comparative fault into
280
the Riggs court rightly deferred to the
section 611A.045,
legislature and achieved its objective to apply the statute as it is
281
written.
V. CONCLUSION
The Riggs holding requires that restitution orders be based
only on the factors enumerated in section 611A.045, Minnesota’s
restitution statute. The holding of Riggs establishes that a victim’s
282
fault may not be considered in determining restitution. Through
statutory interpretation, the Riggs court correctly concluded that
the legislature intended section 611A.045 to be an exclusive list of
factors for determining restitution. Furthermore, the court
properly deferred to the legislature in declining to read
comparative fault into the language of the statute. The policy
reasons for or against incorporating comparative fault into criminal
restitution are best resolved by the legislature. To discourage the
type of dangerous conduct the Riggs victim engaged in and to
prevent the unfairness that comes from forcing trial courts to
reward such behavior, the Minnesota Legislature should consider

277. See, e.g., Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, 776 N.W.2d 431, 440 (Minn.
2009); Haskin v. Ne. Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 216, 123 N.W.2d 81, 86 (1963)
(“The strong considerations of public policy which would justify a change in the
law in this regard are for the legislature and not this court to evaluate.”).
278. See State v. Maidi, 537 N.W.2d 280, 285 (Minn. 1995) (declining to create
an exception to the restitution statute despite concern that providing restitution
for costs that potentially violated the laws of a sovereign nation presents grave
public policy concerns).
279. MINN. STAT. § 645.16; Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown,
849 N.W.2d 55, 60 (Minn. 2014).
280. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 685–86 (Minn. 2015).
281. See id.; see generally MINN. STAT. § 645.16.
282. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 686.
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importing the comparative fault language from Minnesota’s
criminal reparations statute into its criminal restitution statute.
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